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

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Sociopsychological Costs and Benefits of Multiculturalism

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Sociopsychological Costs and Benefits of Multiculturalism

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Foreword

In February 1991, the Economic Council published *New Faces in the Crowd*, a major statement on immigration and immigration policy. It followed this up, in May of the same year, with the research report *Economic and Social Impacts of Immigration*. In considering the social impacts, the policy of multiculturalism needs to be carefully evaluated.

The federal government has been pursuing this policy, for 20 years, as a way of dealing with the diversity of the Canadian population. The primary goal of the policy is to increase intergroup and interpersonal tolerance. This goal is pursued by simultaneously encouraging heritage culture maintenance (in order to provide every one with a sense of identity) and promoting contact, participation, and sharing (in order to integrate those with diverse identities into Canadian society). One major assumption underlying the policy is that only when individuals feel secure in their own identity will they feel sufficiently confident to participate with others and to exhibit good will towards those who differ from them. This working paper analyses these goals and assumptions and reviews the sociopsychological evidence surrounding them. The relative costs and benefits of multiculturalism, and of its alternatives (mainly assimilation and segregation), are examined, and the conclusion is drawn that the multicultural option is the only viable one for Canada.

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Judith Maxwell
Chairman

This paper outlines the issues, and presents some theoretical and empirical arguments, with respect to the social costs and benefits of maintaining a multicultural society in Canada. One point of view taken is that of social and cultural psychology, in which individuals (and the ethnic groups to which they belong) are considered to be the major actors in the multicultural arena. While there are certainly other costs and benefits (e.g., economic and political), these are not the focus of this paper. The issues addressed are those raised in the initial paper "Immigration: a possible study" (topics 8 and 9) and later elaborated in the "Report to the second advisory committee meeting: immigration project" (section 3).

Given the increasing immigration to Canada from Asia, South and Central America, and other "nontraditional" source countries, and given the greater "visibility" and differences in languages and cultures of these immigrants, the following questions may be posed:

1 Can Canada integrate these newer immigrants harmoniously without risking a higher potential for friction and violence?

2 What kind of benefits can be expected from a more diverse society?

3 What role does the policy of multiculturalism play, both in enhancing multicultural benefits and in increasing risk of conflict?

This paper begins with an overview of the multiculturalism policy and programmes including the original policy and recent changes in priorities. Second, the changing pattern of immigration that has brought us to the present demographic profile in Canada will be reviewed. Third, the two major domains of social and cultural psychology that contribute to the study of ethnic and race relations and immigrant acculturation are outlined; some current ideas and theories are reviewed, and some implications are drawn. Fourth, on the basis of these materials, the empirical evidence is presented and evaluated. Finally, some of the social costs and benefits are outlined, and some recommendations are made with respect to immigration and multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism Policy in Canada

While numerous attempts were made historically to assimilate Canada's diverse population to British cultural norms [Palmer 1975], by 1956 the federal government's view was that assimilation had not worked anywhere in the contemporary world, and that it was impracticable as a general policy. By 1971, largely in response to the report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (particularly to volume 4, *The Cultural Contributions of the Other Ethnic Groups*), Prime Minister Trudeau announced a policy of multiculturalism [House of Commons, *Debates*, 8 October 1971].

To assist our understanding of this policy, we may identify and place four elements of the policy in a framework (Figure 1). First, the policy wishes to avoid assimilation by encouraging ethnic groups to maintain and develop themselves as distinctive groups within Canadian society; this element we term "own-group maintenance and development." Second, a fundamental purpose of the policy is to increase intergroup harmony and the mutual acceptance of all groups that maintain and develop themselves; this we term "other-group acceptance and tolerance." Third, the policy argues that own-group development by itself is not sufficient to lead to other-group acceptance; "intergroup contact and sharing" is also required. Fourth, full participation by groups cannot be achieved if some common language is not learned; thus the "learning of official languages" is also encouraged by the policy. In addition to identifying these four elements of the policy, Figure 1 also displays some interrelationships (connecting lines between elements). A few of these are explicit in the policy, others are implicit, and others will be referred to in this paper when considering the sociopsychological literature on ethnic relations.

A central question is whether the policy intends to encourage the maintenance of numerous and full-scale cultural systems (as implied in the term *multiculturalism*), or whether it is designed to be supportive of some lesser

Figure 1

Four Components of the 1971 Multiculturalism Policy



SOURCE Berry [1984a].

phenomenon (such as various aspects of ethnicity that are derived from a full cultural system). Burnet [1975] has argued that "ethnicity" rather than "culture" is the actual and realistic focus of such a policy: most groups lack their own separate social and political institutions, many lack their own (ancestral) language, and their numbers are not always large. Thus the maintenance of shared features that are derived from a heritage culture (i.e., ethnic phenomena) is more likely to be possible than the maintenance of full-scale cultures ("museum cultures" in Burnet's terms).

A second criticism has been levelled by Porter [1972, 1975], who argued that maintaining an interest in ethnicity merely perpetuates ethnic stratification in Canadian society and that multiculturalism may serve only to keep particular groups in their place in the "vertical mosaic." It may also provide a basis for discrimination [Lupul 1989]. While undoubtedly there has been important stratification according to ethnic group membership in the past, and perhaps at the present time for some groups, recent evidence [e.g., Boyd et al. 1981; Pineo and Porter 1985; Breton et al. 1990] suggests that ethnicity is no longer a substantial predictor of status in Canada. Indeed, educational and occupational aspirations and attainments of some newer immigrant groups now exceed those of groups at the top of Porter's original hierarchy [Richmond 1988; Samuda et al. 1989].

A third difficulty is that multiculturalism is widely viewed as a policy only for the non-British and non-French portions of the Canadian population. While having its roots in concerns expressed about the place of "the other ethnic groups," the initial policy statement in 1971, as well as more recent statements [see Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada, *Annual Report*, 1988/89], emphasizes that the policy is for *all* Canadians, whether they are members of a dominant or nondominant group, or part of the majority or a minority.

After a decade and a half with programmes based on the 1971 statement, multiculturalism was formally achieved by the enactment (on 21 July 1988) of a multiculturalism policy entitled "An Act for the Preservation and Enhancement of Multiculturalism in Canada." The Act is explicitly linked to a number of extant features of Canadian policy: the constitutional recognition of the importance of preserving and enhancing the multicultural heritage of Canadians, the rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada, and two official languages in Canada; the equality of all Canadians, whether so by birth or by choice; the equality of opportunity, regardless of race, national or ethnic origin, or colour; freedom from discrimination based on culture, religion, or language; and the recognition of the diversity of Canadians as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society.

The specific clauses of the Act refer to a number of themes. Foremost among them are: a) the promotion of the freedom of all Canadians to preserve,

enhance, and share their cultural heritage; b) the promotion of multiculturalism as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian heritage and identity, and as an invaluable resource in the shaping of Canada's future; c) the promotion of full and equitable participation of individuals and communities of all origins, and the elimination of barriers to such participation; d) the recognition of the contribution of Canadian cultural communities and the need to enhance their development; e) the assurance of equal protection to individuals under the law, while respecting and valuing their diversity; and f) the need to encourage Canadian institutions to be both respectful and inclusive of Canada's multicultural character. Other themes emphasize the creativity and evolution that result from cultures in contact and the importance of both heritage and official languages in Canada.

The 1989 "New Directions" of Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada (rooted in the new Act) retained many of these features, while giving new emphasis to certain aspects. The first new programme is Race Relations and Cross-Cultural Understanding, which can be identified generally with the "tolerance" goal in the 1971 statement. However, the racial dimension is now at the fore, with public education, cross-cultural training, and community-based initiatives being seen as the vehicles for pursuing a reduction in racial intolerance. The second new programme is Heritage Cultures and Languages, which is similar to the "group maintenance" goal of the 1971 statement. While continuing cultural support programmes, there is a renewed emphasis on heritage language learning. The third new programme is Community Support and Participation, which is related to the "contact and sharing" goal of the 1971 statement. However, there is now much greater emphasis on full and equal access to participation by all Canadians in all aspects of Canadian society. Another new initiative is a cross-government commitment, one in which the multicultural view of Canada is promoted not just in the Ministry of Multiculturalism and Citizenship, but encouraged in all federal departments.

Current Canadian views about the multiculturalism policy are as diverse as the population itself [Kalin and Berry 1991]. Despite the emphasis on sharing in the 1971 statement and 1988 Act, many Canadians are voicing the idea that an emphasis on our ethnic differences, even as a quality which characterizes us as a nation, reduces our achievement of becoming "Canadian" [Bibby 1990; Spicer 1991]. In part, the naming of the new ministry as "Multiculturalism and *Citizenship*" was intended to signal a balance between the age-old Canadian opposition between unity and identity [Frye 1971]. Moreover, there is not yet a wide understanding of the change in emphasis from the "cultural maintenance" aspects of the policy to the "race relations" and "participation" programmes. For example, Spicer [1991, p. 129] proposes that "federal government funding for multiculturalism activities other than those serving immigrant orientation, reduction of racial discrimination and promotion of equality should be eliminated." However, this recommended

set of priorities is virtually identical to those in place since 1989. In a sense, the pendulum appears to be swinging away from a concern for particular heritages, towards a concern for national unity, and away from a celebration of our numerous cultural identities, towards the promotion of an emerging Canadian identity.

Immigration and the Changing Canadian Population

Canada has always been culturally plural as a society (1871 census: 60 per cent British; 31 per cent French; 9 per cent others, including native peoples). However, a considerable impetus has been given to multiculturalism by the increasingly diverse sources of immigration over the past century. Initially from Eastern Europe, then from Southern Europe, and now increasingly from other countries than Europe, immigration can be said to have given rise to multiculturalism [Palmer 1975].

At the present time (1986 census), British and French origins still account for the majority of the national population (33.6 per cent and 24.4 per cent, respectively), but this varies widely by region. Other than British and French origins, German, Italian, Ukrainian, Dutch, and aboriginal origins are the most frequent (ranging from 6.5 per cent to 2 per cent for these groups). While still relatively small in total number in Canada (6 per cent), visible minorities represent substantial elements of regional and urban populations (11 per cent in British Columbia, 9 per cent in Ontario, 17 per cent in Toronto and Vancouver, and 10 per cent in Calgary), and their immigration continues at a relatively high proportion (over 50 per cent of immigrants in 1990). Despite these numerous changes and trends, the proportion of foreign-born persons has tended to remain fairly constant (between 15 and 20 per cent of the total population) since Confederation.

Future trends are difficult to predict, given the volatile political and economic situations at present, especially in Eastern Europe and South East Asia. Indeed the Demographic Review [Health and Welfare Canada 1989], while engaging in population projections in a number of demographic categories, avoided such projections with respect to ethnic origin. However, one study carried out for the review [Balakrishnan 1988] did project ethnic populations for 25 major urban areas and concluded that visible minority groups will increase to 10.7 per cent of urban populations by the year 2001. In the country as a whole, however, this predicted increase is less likely to occur, since the bulk of current immigrants settle in the major urban centres. Samuel [1988] predicts a national proportion of visible minorities of between 8.7 and 9.6 per cent.

Ethnic and Race Relations in Canada

In this and the following section, the two main areas of psychological work in multicultural societies are introduced and reviewed, that is, ethnic relations and acculturation. The two areas have remained distinct to a large extent, but there are sufficient parallels to draw them together. First, both areas arise only in culturally plural societies. Second, they share a concern for group contact and resultant change in some basic social and psychological phenomena. Third, there is a central role for affective states (attitudes and ideologies) that indicate what people think and what they feel *should be* the case. Fourth, there are some obvious behavioural outcomes for individuals (changes in their behaviours and identities, and acts of discrimination). And, fifth, both lead to an outcome which ranges from being stressful and conflict-ridden to an adaptation which accommodates the needs of people in contact, both newcomers and the established larger society.

The study of ethnic and race relations is a vast topic, one that cannot possibly be covered in this paper. Rather than reviewing the current empirical knowledge about ethnic group relations in Canada, Figure 2 illustrates some current conceptualizations. Results of empirical studies will be presented later.

The figure can be looked upon as a map of relationships between some sociocultural factors (at the top) and the main psychological variables (in the lower box) used in the psychological study of ethnic and race relations. Three kinds of psychological variables are identified: cognition (involving the processes of perception and categorization of people and the attribution of characteristics to them); evaluation (involving judgments about their acceptance or rejection); and overt behaviour or action on the part of the individual (involving acts of discrimination against them).

There is considered to be a sequence to these psychological activities, beginning with the perception of similarities and differences among individuals in a population (e.g., tallness/shortness; long hair/short hair; light skin/dark skin, etc.). This is followed by a cognitive categorization of individuals into groups based on perceived patterns of similarities and differences (e.g., males/females; blacks/whites, etc.). The act of categorization, by itself, is known to have two consequences: the exaggeration of perceived similarity within categories and of perceived difference between categories [e.g., Tajfel 1978]. Finally, psychological characteristics are attributed by the perceiver to individual members of the categories. Because of the effects of categorization noted above, this attribution tends to overgeneralize the similarity of characteristics within, and the difference between, the groups. This whole sequence, while rooted in these three fundamental psychological processes, is also guided by collective images that have been generally shared in the sociocultural context, probably for many generations.

Figure 2

Framework for Examining Relationships between Sociocultural and Psychological Factors in Research on Ethnic Group Relations



A second set of psychological processes follows, involving the making of value judgments and the exhibiting of personal preferences. When these are linked to a specific group, the concept of *attitude* is employed; these can be favourable or unfavourable. However, when there is a generalized value judgment, the concept of *prejudice* is used; this is typically a negative or hostile evaluation, although in principle, positive prejudices are possible. The development and holding of such attitudes and prejudices are rooted in an individual's emotional system, but they are also known to be linked to numerous historical, economic, and political factors in the sociocultural system in which one has grown up.

The third psychological variable is that of individual action, in which the cognitions and evaluations of the individual become expressed in actual behaviour. These behaviours are subject to personal motivations, but they are also guided (either encouraged or suppressed) by shared norms in society, such as laws or social movements. It is important to note that individuals do not always express their cognitions and evaluations of ethnic and racial groups in overt ways; hence, psychologists have had to develop measurement techniques to dig more deeply and indirectly into the phenomena of stereotypes, prejudices, and attitudes.

Because ethnic groups tend to vary on a number of dimensions, psychologists have attended to these possible confounds. Such dimensions as culture, race, religion, and language are known to interact in complex ways; hence they require independent conceptualization and measurement. For example, an immigrant from India may be admired or rejected on the basis of cultural values, racial features, religion, or accent; we would not know the extent of influence of each factor on a person's attitude unless we first made the distinction and then attempted independent assessment of each factor. This possible "multiple causation" of behaviour makes it difficult to know, for any particular study, which factor is responsible, or which factors in combination lie at the root of discrimination or conflict.

Of course, no programme to improve ethnic and race relations can attend only to these psychological phenomena. Clearly, all the nonpsychological factors identified in Figure 2 need to be attended to as well. Among these are four current issues in the social psychology of ethnic and race relations that have been prominent in the literature on multiculturalism in Canada: the institutional and normative nature of prejudice; the effects of security; the role of contact; and the importance of group similarity.

Prejudice

While prejudice is essentially a psychological phenomenon, it can become established in social norms and societal practices that may or may not any longer have negative affect or animosity underlying the practice. Hence a distinction has been drawn between *personal* and *institutional* prejudice. The former involves negative feelings by a person towards another person or group, while the latter may not; institutional prejudice is prejudice that has become conventional, but not necessarily with any personal intent to harm, injure, or attack. Because of the different character of these forms of prejudice, change or control mechanisms would need to be different depending on whether one or the other (or both) is present.

Similarly, a distinction has been drawn between *blatant* and *subtle* prejudice. The former (sometimes called old-fashioned prejudice) is revealed in overt acts of verbal or physical hostility, such as insults, attacks, and deliberate acts of discrimination. The latter is covert (sometimes called symbolic prejudice) and is revealed in "more acceptable" activities, such as being opposed to various forms of equity or other social change programmes. In the last decade, changing social norms (both informal and formal laws) have made blatant prejudice socially unacceptable, even illegal. Hence the expression of prejudice has become subjected to normative influence (as in the case of institutional prejudice) and can no longer be considered a purely psychological phenomenon.

Security

The 1971 multiculturalism policy statement proposed that confidence in one's own individual identity was a plausible precondition for accepting the different identities of others. We have previously referred to this as the multiculturalism assumption [Berry et al. 1977], and this notion was included in Figure 1 as one possible relationship between own-group maintenance and other-group tolerance. That is, if one feels secure and has a place in the Canadian mosaic, then one can be open and accepting also of a place for those who belong to other groups. The alternative relationship is also possible: that developing one's own-group confidence can lead to ethnocentrism (this is also illustrated in Figure 1). This alternative relationship is indeed the basis of the ethnocentrism theory [LeVine and Campbell 1972] in which positive own-group attitudes are often negatively correlated with attitudes towards other groups.

Contact

Ever since the classic analyses of Amir [1976], it has been established that personal experience with members of other groups can lead to either increased liking or increased hostility. The outcome depends on some specific factors. Positive outcomes are likely when there is equal status of the groups, presence of common goals, and contact is voluntary and intimate. Negative outcomes are likely when there is status inequality, competition for scarce resources, and enforced interaction. When social conditions vary, the outcome of contact will vary; hence attitude change is a social as well as a psychological phenomenon. Issues such as those raised by the Economic Council (e.g., the "integrative capacity" of Canada to accept visible minority immigrants, and the possibility of a numerical "threshold" for such acceptance) are clearly related to the relationship between contact and prejudice. This relationship is also illustrated in Figure 1.

Group Similarity

An important element in intergroup and interpersonal attitudes is that of the similarity of the groups or persons in contact: the greater the similarity, the greater the attraction. Whether found in experimental or in field studies, this relationship appears to be robust. It appears to apply to both psychological similarity in the case of interpersonal attraction (e.g., similar beliefs or interests are associated with greater liking) and cultural similarity in the case of intergroup attraction (e.g., shared group characteristics, such as language, religion, values, and norms, are associated with greater group acceptance). An obvious implication of this relationship is that since groups who are now arriving as immigrants in Canada are rather dissimilar from those already established in the country, less acceptance of them may be expected, at least initially. To the extent that these groups acculturate to the larger society by adopting some generally shared Canadian norms and values, then increased acceptance may result. We now turn to a consideration of such acculturation phenomena.

Immigrant Acculturation Patterns

How immigrants and ethnic groups change over time and adapt to the larger Canadian society is an important aspect of group relations [see Berry 1990*a*]. As we noted earlier, there are important parallels between ethnic relations and acculturation as cultural and psychological phenomena, both resulting in the possibility of outcomes ranging from positive mutual adaptation to stress and conflict. We have also seen that not all the adaptation and change are expected to come from those newly arrived: official multiculturalism policy involves the promotion of some adaptation on the part of the larger society (referred to as institutional change). Thus acculturation is, in principle, a two-way street.

Acculturation was first identified as a cultural-level phenomenon by anthropologists [e.g., Redfield et al., 1936], who defined it as culture change resulting from contact between two autonomous cultural groups. Although, in principle, change occurs in both groups, in practice, more change occurs in the nondominant than in the dominant group.

Acculturation is also an individual-level phenomenon, requiring individual members of both the larger society and the various acculturating groups to engage in new behaviours and to work out new forms of relationships in their daily lives. This idea was introduced by Graves [1967], who proposed the notion of "psychological acculturation" to refer to these new behaviours and strategies. One of the findings of subsequent research in this area is that there are vast individual differences in how people attempt to deal with acculturative

change (termed acculturation strategies). These strategies have three aspects: people's preferences (acculturation attitudes [see Berry et al. 1989]); how much change they actually undergo (behavioural shifts [see Berry 1980*a*]); and how much of a problem these changes are for them (the phenomenon of acculturative stress [see Berry et al. 1987]).

Perhaps the most useful way to identify the various orientations individuals may have towards acculturation is to note that two issues predominate in the daily life of most acculturating individuals. One pertains to the maintenance and development of one's ethnic distinctiveness in society, deciding whether or not one's own cultural identity and customs are of value and to be retained. The other issue involves the desirability of interethnic contact, deciding whether relations with other groups in the larger society are of value and to be sought. These two questions have obvious similarity with two of the key elements of the multiculturalism policy: own-culture maintenance, and social participation and sharing. These two issues are essentially questions of values and may be responded to on a continuous scale, from positive to negative. For conceptual purposes, however, they can be treated as dichotomous ("yes" and "no") preferences, thus generating a fourfold model (Figure 3). Each cell in this fourfold classification is considered to be an acculturation strategy or option available to individuals and to groups in plural societies, towards which individuals may hold attitudes. These are *assimilation*, *integration*, *separation*, and *marginalization*.

When the first question is answered "no" and the second is answered "yes," the assimilation option is defined, namely, relinquishing one's cultural identity

Figure 3

Four Modes of Acculturation as a Function of Two Issues



and moving into the larger society. This can take place by way of absorption of a nondominant group into an established dominant group, or it can be by way of the merging of many groups to form a new society, as in a "melting pot." In either case, a single relatively uniform culture evolves.

The integration option implies the maintenance of the cultural integrity of the group, as well as the movement by the group to become an integral part of a larger societal framework. In this case, there is a large number of distinguishable ethnic groups, all cooperating within a larger social system, resulting in the "mosaic" that is frequently promoted in Canada. In this case, there is a plural society, in which there are some core values and institutions, but also many cultural variations that are an accepted and valued dimension of society.

When there are no relations with the larger society, and this is accompanied by a maintenance of ethnic identity and traditions, another option is defined. Depending upon which group (dominant or nondominant) controls the situation, this option may take the form of either segregation or separation. When the pattern is imposed by the dominant group, classic segregation to keep people in "their place" appears. On the other hand, the maintenance of a traditional way of life outside full participation in the larger society may derive from a group's desire to lead an independent existence, as in the case of separatist movements. In these terms, segregation and separation differ primarily with respect to which group or groups have the power to determine the outcome.

Finally, there is an option that is difficult to define precisely, possibly because it is accompanied by a good deal of collective and individual confusion and anxiety. It is characterized by striking out against the larger society and by feelings of alienation, loss of identity, and by acculturative stress. This option is marginalization, in which groups lose cultural and psychological contact with both their traditional culture and the larger society. When imposed by the larger society, it is tantamount to ethnocide and constitutes the classical situation of marginality [Stonequist 1935].

It is possible to use this framework to examine acculturation orientations in a number of ways (Figure 4). If we distinguish between dominant and nondominant groups, and between group and individual orientations, we observe four distinct ways in which to use this framework in understanding acculturation phenomena. At the group level, we can examine national policies and the stated goals of particular acculturating groups within the plural society. At the individual level, we can measure the general ideology in the dominant population (termed multicultural ideology by Berry et al. [1977]) or the attitudes that acculturating individuals hold towards these four modes of acculturation [Berry et al. 1989].

Figure 4

Domains of Use of Acculturation Modes

	Group	Individual
Dominant group	National policies	Acculturation ideologies
Acculturating groups	Group goals	Acculturation attitudes

With the use of this framework, comparisons can be made between indi-viduals and their groups (and also between generations within families), and between acculturating peoples and the larger society to which they are acculturating.

Inconsistencies and conflicts between these various acculturation strategies are one of many sources of difficulty for acculturating individuals. Generally, when acculturation experiences cause problems for acculturating individuals, we observe the phenomenon of *acculturative stress* (Figure 5). In a recent overview of this area of research [Berry et al. 1987], it was argued that stress may arise, but it is not inevitable. Or as it has been phrased in a recent report [Canadian Task Force 1988], migrant status is a mental health risk factor, but risk is not destiny.

On the left of the figure, *acculturation* occurs in a particular situation (e.g., migrant community or native settlement), and individuals participate in and experience these changes to varying degrees; thus individual acculturation experience may vary from a great deal to rather little. In the middle, *stressors* may result from this varying experience of acculturation; for some people, acculturative changes may all be in the form of stressors, while for others, they may be benign or even seen as opportunities. On the right, varying levels of *acculturative stress* may become manifest as a result of acculturation experience and stressors.

The first point to note is that relationships among these three concepts (indicated by the solid horizontal arrows) all depend upon a number of moderating factors (indicated in the lower box), including the nature of the larger society, the type of acculturating group, the mode of acculturation being experienced, and a number of demographic, social, and psychological characteristics of the group and individual members. That is, each of these factors can influence the degree and direction of the relationships between the three variables at the top of Figure 5. This influence is indicated by the broken vertical arrows drawn between this set of moderating factors and the horizontal arrows.

Results of studies of acculturative stress have varied widely in the level of difficulties found in acculturating groups. Early views were that culture contact

Figure 5

Factors Affecting Acculturative Stress


Acculturation experience
Much
Little
Stressors
Many
Few
Acculturative stress
High
Low
Factors moderating the relationship between acculturation and stress:
• Mode of acculturation: integration, assimilation, separation, or marginalization;
• Phase of acculturation: contact, conflict, crisis, or adaptation;
• Nature of larger society: multicultural vs. assimilationist; prejudice and discrimination;
• Characteristics of acculturating group: age, status, and social support;
• Characteristics of acculturating individual: appraisal, coping, attitudes, and contact.

and change inevitably led to stress; however, current views (as depicted in Figure 5) are that stress is linked to acculturation in a probabilistic way, and the level of stress experienced will depend on a number of factors which will be reviewed later.

The larger society will be affected by these acculturation phenomena in a number of ways. Drawing upon some of the concepts reviewed earlier, if the assimilation or integration modes are adopted, then *contact* is directly involved and, particularly for assimilation, *similarity* will likely increase between the groups in contact. On the other hand, in the separation or marginality modes, there is little *contact*, and *similarity* may also be perceived to be low. Second, since acculturative stress phenomena are generally viewed as socially or psychologically unacceptable, groups exhibiting such behaviours may well be rejected by the larger society, thus involving low contact and negative attitudes. Third, both these outcomes may well lead to the institutionalization of rejection and hostility, resulting in ghettos, educational discrimination, high incarceration, and other forms of social, economic, political, and spatial discrimination.

In such a set of circumstances, the larger society may establish rather permanent psychological and social protective barriers, including prejudice and discrimination, and both formal and informal rules of avoidance and exclusion. Further, while attempts to reduce these barriers (through bilingualism, multiculturalism, and equity policies and programmes) may be promoted and accepted by economic and political elites in the larger society, popular reaction (backlash) in the majority of the population is a distinct possibility (see top of Figure 1). Indeed, some evidence of this backlash is presented in the Spicer report and in recent national polls on these issues [Kalin and Berry 1991].

Overview of the Empirical Evidence

The first two sections of this paper established the two broad sociopolitical contexts (multiculturalism and immigration), while the last two sections outlined the main issues with respect to intergroup relations and acculturation. In this section we present an overview of what is known, from empirical studies in social and cultural psychology, about the current situation in Canada. We begin by examining evidence about ethnic and race relations. We then turn to evidence about patterns of psychological acculturation and how these may affect the larger society.

Ethnic and Race Relations

Earlier we outlined some domains and issues that assume central importance in understanding intergroup relations in a plural society. Two domains are *contact and sharing*, and *group acceptance and tolerance* (as identified in Figure 1). These will be reviewed first, before turning to their effects on intergroup relations.

With respect to contact and sharing, we are concerned with evidence of actual intergroup contact, as distinct from the attitudinal and other effects of contact, which we will leave to the later section.

What are the opportunities for contact? Although Canada's population is ethnically diverse, it is distributed in a way that provides variable opportunities for contact between members of different groups. While French-Canadians comprise over one quarter of the population, there are many areas of Canada where few reside; hence the sheer opportunity to have contact may be minimal. Similarly, with native peoples who are distributed more towards the north, and visible minorities who tend to reside in either Montreal, Toronto, Calgary, or Vancouver, the possibility of direct firsthand contact may be slight for many Canadians.

While knowledge of contact opportunities is important as a measure of interaction potential, it is also important to know whether these potential situations are represented cognitively by individuals. In the analysis by Kalin and Berry [1982*a*], ratings by non-members of a particular group of how "well known" the group was to them exhibited substantial group-level correlations with census-established percentages of those groups in the respondents' district. Thus it appears that individuals are well aware of the ethnicity of those (other than their own group) who live in their immediate surroundings; that is, ethnic percentage statistics are not simply a mere census statistic, they are perceived and subjectively represented by others.

With respect to tolerance, to what extent is there variation in acceptance of different ethnic groups in Canada? More generally, what is the degree of tolerance in Canadian society, how is it to be conceptualized, and how is it distributed? The attitudinal evidence is quite clear on the first question: not all groups are accorded the same degree of acceptance (Table 1). Studies show that the most acceptable are the two charter groups (English- and French-Canadians), followed by those of North European ancestry, then by those of Eastern and Southern European ancestries, and finally by Oriental, South Asian, and West Indian immigrants, and Canadian natives. While there are exceptions to this generalization (e.g., Japanese-Canadians tend to receive more positive attitudes than this general characterization indicates), there is widespread evidence [Palmer 1975] that this situation has existed historically and is related to a group's prestige [Pineo 1977]. A review of recent polls suggests that these earlier findings have remained relatively stable over time (see Kalin and Berry [1991] for a national overview, and Dion [1985, 1989] for recent evidence from Toronto).

To some extent, this hierarchy of group acceptance is due to those most numerous in the population rendering generally more positive own-group evaluations; thus the hierarchy parallels closely the percentage representation of each group in the Canadian population. However, an analysis [Berry and Kalin 1979] which controls for own-group (or ethnocentric) self-evaluations tends to show that this ethnic hierarchy is generally shared by most groups and is independent of who is asked for their evaluations of groups other than their own.

At a more general level, beyond that of attitudes towards specific groups, there is evidence that tolerance varies by ethnic group [Berry et al. 1977]: those of British ancestry tend to exhibit more general ethnic tolerance than those of French ancestry. However, socioeconomic status also affects the distribution of ethnic tolerance and may account, in part, for this ethnic group difference.

Some local studies have also suggested that attitudes towards non-whites continue to be more negative than towards whites. For example, studies by

Table 1

Perceived Ethnic Hierarchy (Attitudes)

Standard list of ethnic groups	Mean	*N*	Rank	Respondent nominated ethnic groups	Mean	*N*
English	0.52	1801	1			
			2	Scottish	0.49	186
French	0.47	1786	3			
			4	Dutch	0.46	138
			5	Scandinavian	0.39	94
			6	Irish	0.37	142
			7	Belgian	0.35	48
			8	Japanese	0.13	111
			9	Hungarian	0.10	93
			10	Polish	0.08	230
Jewish	0.04	1717	11			
German	0.02	1716	12			
			13	Czech	0.02	47
			14	Russian	–0.07	79
			15	Yugoslavian	–0.09	54
			16	West Indian	–0.11	48
Immigrants in general	–0.12	1736	17			
Ukrainian	–0.13	1601	18			
Italian	–0.20	1719	19			
			20	Portuguese	–0.25	112
Chinese	–0.26	1736	21			
			22	Spanish	–0.31	39
			23	Greek	–0.36	127
Canadian Indian	–0.46	1786	24			
			25	Negro	–0.52	61
			26	East Indian	–0.95	102

Source Berry et al. [1977].

Henry and Ginzberg [1985] and Henry [1989] in Toronto demonstrate job discrimination against black and Indo-Pakistani Canadians. In these two studies, there were two parts: a telephone approach and an in-person job application. In the former, white Canadians (with no foreign accent) and white immigrants, West Indians, and Indo-Pakistanis (all with accents) made phone enquiries. In the in-person part, matched pairs of black and white applicants sought the available position. In the 1985 study, there was evidence of substantial job discrimination against non-whites in both parts. However, in the 1989 study, black in-person applicants received the same number of job offers as white applicants, but there was evidence that whites were treated better

(more politely, etc.). In the telephone part, however, the 1989 results still exhibited evidence of discrimination, with more white Canadians being told that the job was still open than white immigrants, West Indians, or Indo-Pakistanis.

In another study in Toronto by Breton et al. [1990], two questions were asked. Members of various ethnic groups were asked about how they perceived their acceptance by neighbours, and majority-group members were asked about their acceptance of those of other groups as neighbours. The results indicate variation by group in how accepted the various groups see themselves: West Indians, Chinese, and Jews are lower, while Germans, Ukrainians, Portuguese, and Italians are higher. This pattern is generally repeated with attitudes expressed by majority-group members.

Work by Kalin [1981] on the effect of accent on job suitability ratings shows discrimination, but in two directions: both West Indians and South Asians were rated relatively low in suitability for a high-status job (plant foreman), but relatively high in suitability for a low-status job (plant cleaner).

In summary, there is clear-cut evidence that ethnic attitudes towards groups vary widely, a suggestion that general ethnic tolerance varies by ethnicity and that discrimination (while possibly declining [Bibby 1987]) remains a problem for some groups under some conditions.

When the multiculturalism policy states that "confidence in one's own individual identity" can provide a basis for "respect for that of others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes and assumptions," there are two assumptions made. One is that own-group development and maintenance permits a sense of confidence which will lead to other-group acceptance and tolerance; this we have called the *multicultural assumption* [Berry et al. 1977, p. 192] and was shown at the top of Figure 1. The other is that group development and maintenance permits group sharing. In this section, we will consider the first of these assumptions and return later to the other.

What evidence do we have that confidence in one's identity leads to ethnic tolerance or, conversely, that threats to one's identity nurture intolerance? In answering this question we need to distinguish between two forms of "confidence." If we mean simply "own-group glorification" or "strongly positive ingroup attitudes," then the ethnocentrism theory [LeVine and Campbell 1972] predicts an opposite relationship to that assumed in the policy. Indeed, in the national survey conducted by Berry et al. [1977], the more positively one rated one's own group, the more negatively one rated all other groups (except in the case of Angloceltic- and French-Canadians, where a positive correlation exists). Brewer and Campbell [1976] and many others attest to the near universality of this typically negative, or ethnocentric, pattern.

However, the multiculturalism policy does not appear to intend to develop confidence by own-group glorification. If we render the notion of confidence as a "sense of security" or as "self-esteem," then there is some evidence of a positive correlation with ethnic tolerance. In the general literature [Bagley 1979], and with children [Aboud and Skerry 1984], there is clear evidence that those with higher self-esteem tend to be more accepting of other ethnic groups. In the Berry et al. [1977] study, confidence was measured by two scales: one involved cultural security (the degree to which Angloceltic- and French-Canadians did not feel culturally or linguistically threatened by multiculturalism), and the other, economic security (the degree to which these same groups did not feel that their jobs and wages were threatened by immigration). For both security measures, there was a pattern of consistent, positive correlations with a variety of measures of general ethnic tolerance; however, the relationships with attitudes towards specific ethnic groups, while generally positive, were not so strong. Of particular interest is that both security measures correlate negatively with attitudes towards one's own group among Angloceltic- and French-Canadians.

More recent work with measuring security has revealed a consistent pattern of relationships between both cultural and economic security and tolerance. In a study of members of the Alliance for the Preservation of English in Canada (APEC), Berry and Bourcier [1989] found that perceived threats and feelings of insecurity about one's cultural place in Canadian society, and about one's economic prospects, were the most substantial predictors of negative attitudes towards official bilingualism and towards French-Canadians. Similarly, Cameron and Berry [1990] found in a sample of community college students that feelings of cultural and economic security, and of high self-esteem, were important predictors of the acceptance of immigrants and refugees in Canada.

These studies, mainly among dominant populations, show that the relationship between a sense of security in one's own cultural place is consistently associated with tolerance towards those who are culturally different. Since the multiculturalism policy seeks to promote confidence in one's identity among *all* Canadians, it is important to know that this psychological phenomenon appears to exist independently of which groups (dominant or non-dominant) are examined.

Thus there appears to be some support for the multicultural assumption when confidence in one's identity is understood as a sense of security or as self-esteem. However, if understood as own-group or self-glorification, then ethnic attitudes are not more positive under these conditions. Clearly, what must be promoted by programmes implementing the policy is a non-ethnocentric pride in one's group, one that recognizes the positive qualities but also the limitations, and the group's uniqueness and distinctiveness as well as the commonalities with others. It now becomes clear why the contact

and sharing component is part of the policy as well as the own-group development component (see Figure 1). Without this contact, isolation and a lack of perspective on one's own-group qualities and defects are the likely result, leading to the ethnocentric pattern.

In addition to the multicultural assumption and ethnocentric relationship between these two policy components, there is in principle the possibility that if a group becomes well developed in Canadian society it may be the target of envy. This possibility reverses the direction of relationship that is anticipated by the policy, but it should not be overlooked as a possible outcome. If a group develops to the point where some might view it as "too successful," do members of that group become the object of resentment and backlash (see Figure 1) rather than being admired for their achievement? Historically, anti-Semitism has been explained in part in these terms. At the present time, religious groups with the highest educational attainment in Canada are the Jews and Hindus, while those of Asian ethnic origin are also high in educational attainment. While no current research is known regarding this issue, backlash is a possible alternative to the improvement in ethnic relations anticipated in the policy and should not be overlooked.

The validity of the *contact hypothesis* appears to be assumed in the policy: that is, group contact will be positively associated with group acceptance. As we have noted, however, a number of other factors govern this assumed relationship. Studies of the contact hypothesis in Canada are generally supportive. For example, in a further analysis of the 1977 data base, Kalin and Berry [1982*a*] examined the question of contact within census tracts (essentially neighbourhoods). As we saw earlier, this analysis showed that ethnicity is being signalled accurately, as evidenced by the strong correlations between percentage ethnic-group composition and ratings (by non-members) of the target group on how well known they were. The same kind of question is possible with evaluative ratings: are non-members more or less positive in their attitudes as a function of the percentage composition of a particular ethnic group in their neighbourhood? Early studies in the United States (of white's attitudes towards blacks) suggest that there is an "ideal ratio" required to achieve positive attitudes, but beyond this proportion there is a "tipping point" where attitudes become more negative.

The results of Kalin and Berry (Figure 6) indicate a positive relationship generally for the groups in their study (German, Italian, and Ukrainian immigrants evaluated by non-members; French-Canadians by Anglocelts outside Quebec; French-Canadians by others outside Quebec; and English-Canadians by French-Canadians inside Quebec). The one exception is the evaluation of Canadian Indians by others; here there is a negative relationship. They concluded that contact probably enhances positive attitudes, at least in residential neighbourhoods where contact is generally voluntary and at roughly equal

Figure 6

Attitudes Towards Various Ethnic Groups by Nonmembers of Those Groups, as a Function of the Group's Percentage Presence in the Respondent's Neighbourhood



Figure 6 (cont'd.)



SOURCE Kalin and Berry [1982a].

status. However, in no case was percentage composition higher than 20 per cent, and so the possibility of a "tipping point" above that figure remains a possibility. Moreover, all the groups (except one) were of European origin; and the one non-European group (Canadian Indians) was viewed more negatively as its proportion increased. It is not known whether this different relationship is due to race or some other factor (such as perceived competition based on aboriginal rights; or on maintenance of cultural distinctiveness, either through non-participation in the larger society or by marginalization, both of which would reduce perceived similarity). Hence it is not possible to generalize this single exception to other racially distinctive groups in Canada.

In the studies reviewed, some of the controlling conditions were clearly present. In the social ecology study, for example, roughly equal status (as well as voluntariness) likely characterizes most residential neighbourhoods in Canada; individuals tend to settle where they feel at home, and the census tracts selected as the units of study tend to be constructed by Statistics Canada to represent fairly homogeneous status areas. Whether contact and acceptance are positively correlated beyond these particular groups and research methods is an urgent and practical question. For, as Amir [1976] has pointed out, programmes designed to bring about mutual acceptance through mutual acquaintance can easily backfire, leading to an increase in intolerance.

Psychological Acculturation

Three major topics are addressed in this section: acculturation attitudes, behavioural shifts, and acculturative stress.

Not everyone in the acculturation arena has the same views about how the process should take place or adopt the same strategies for engaging the process. *Attitudes towards acculturation* can be held by individuals in both the immigrant groups and the larger society. These have been conceptualized and assessed in Canada following the frameworks outlined earlier in Figures 3 and 4. For the larger society, Canadian official views are expressed through multiculturalism policies (both federal and provincial), while individual views are expressed through the *multicultural ideology* held by Canadian citizens. This latter was assessed by Berry et al. [1977]. While there was considerable variation across regional and ethnic groups, there was moderate acceptance of the multicultural option (essentially the integration mode in Figure 3), combined with moderate rejection of the two alternatives of assimilation and separation. Views about marginalization were not assessed in that study.

For acculturating groups in Canada (see Berry et al. [1989] for a detailed review; and Lambert et al. [1986] and Moghaddam et al. [1989] for specific studies), ethnocultural groups generally accept multiculturalism, and individual attitudes favour integration, while rejecting the other three alternatives. For French-Canadians outside Quebec, as well as Portuguese, Korean, and Hungarian immigrants, the rank order was generally the same: integration was most preferred, followed either by assimilation or separation, and with marginalization clearly unacceptable. A similar pattern has also been found for aboriginal peoples in Canada [Berry 1980*b*]. However, South Asian immigrant women in Montreal show some degree of ambivalence with respect to heritage culture maintenance in general and, at the same time, strong support for some particular aspects of heritage culture [Moghaddam and Taylor 1987].

We thus have a rather clear coinciding of views at the present time in Canada. All four levels of orientations towards acculturation (i.e., in the larger society and acculturating groups, and at both the policy and individual attitudinal levels) are generally positive towards integration, while rejecting the other alternatives to varying degrees. This broad consensus provides a baseline upon which to seek to improve intergroup relations in Canada. As we saw earlier, for intergroup contact to result in more positive mutual attitudes, we need some shared superordinate goals. This consensus about how groups should relate to each other (integration) is one such common goal: that is, the view that all peoples may retain aspects of their cultural heritage to the extent that they wish, while at the same time seeking to (and being free to) participate as fully as possible in the life of the larger society.

With respect to *behavioural shifts* (see Berry [1980*a*] for a review), there is now substantial evidence that there is variable change in peoples' daily activities during acculturation, depending on the behavioural domain and on the group. With respect to language, the *Non-Official Languages Study* nationally [O'Bryan et al. 1976] and numerous subsequent studies regionally [e.g., Breton et al. 1990] have shown that there is both large-scale language maintenance and language loss. Similarly, identities and values, dress and food preferences, and many other daily behaviours change during acculturation. Most frequently these changes exhibit acquisition of behaviours that are similar to those which are characteristic of the larger society; but it is not always the case that there is a concomitant loss of behaviours characteristic of the heritage group [Berry 1990*a*]. That is, sometimes there is behavioural assimilation (involving heritage culture loss and larger society acquisition), and sometimes there is behavioural integration (involving behaviours rooted in both cultural traditions), such as bilingualism, hyphenated identities, and day-by-day behavioural switching according to immediate context and need. The implication of these kinds of behavioural changes is that the increased *similarity* (both cultural and psychological) between the groups in contact is likely to lead to greater mutual acceptance.

In contrast, where behaviours do not change very much (as is the case of those who are following the separation strategy), the maintenance of a lifestyle largely unaltered by living in Canada appears to be a source of negative attitudes and discrimination among members of the larger society. However, little direct evidence for this relationship is available and urgent research is needed on the subject. Similarly, the lack of responsive change among individual members and institutions of the larger society appears to be a major irritant for acculturating individuals and groups, especially for visible minorities. Once again, though, little empirical evidence (other than observations and anecdotes) is available on this point and research is much needed.

The social and psychological characteristics of those who have become marginalized were previously described. Since these qualities are generally negatively valued, they are very likely to be irritants for members of the larger society, who often consider such persons and groups to be responsible for their own situation. Converting this "blaming the victim" attitude in the larger society into one that accepts major responsibility for what has taken place is a precondition for improved intergroup relations. At the same time, such social and psychological problems have to become "owned" by the marginalized group, in the double sense of recognizing and accepting their existence ("owning up"), and in taking responsibility for bringing about change within their own communities. The experience in Canada with such marginalized situations and groups (e.g., Metis, urban native peoples, and blacks in Nova Scotia) should convince us of the importance of the issue; the essential test of Canada's ability to evolve equitable and tolerant human relations will be

our capacity to solve extant marginalized situations and to avoid developing other ones among newly immigrating groups.

Acculturation, as we have seen, can often involve considerable stress; for this outcome the notion of *acculturative stress* has been developed. There is evidence [Berry et al. 1987] that one's acculturation strategy is one important factor in such stress: those who feel marginalized tend to be highly stressed, and those who maintain a separation goal are also stressed. In contrast, those who pursue integration are minimally stressed, with assimilation leading to intermediate levels. The phase of acculturation is also important. Those in first contact and those who have achieved some long-term adaptation tend to be less stressed than those caught in the conflict or crisis phase, especially, as we have noted, if they also feel marginalized.

Another factor is the way in which the host society exerts its acculturative influences. One important distinction is the degree of pluralism present in a society [Murphy 1965]. Culturally plural societies, in contrast to culturally monistic ones, are likely to be characterized by two important factors: one is the availability of a network of social and cultural groups that may provide support for those entering into the experience of acculturation; and the other is a greater tolerance for, or acceptance of, cultural diversity (termed multicultural ideology by Berry et al. [1977]). One might reasonably expect the stress of persons experiencing acculturation in plural societies to be lower than those in monistic societies who pursue a forced inclusion or assimilationist ideology.

In assimilationist societies, there are a number of factors operating that will plausibly lead to greater acculturative stress than in pluralistic societies. If a person regularly receives the message that one's culture, language, and identity are unacceptable, the impact on one's sense of security and self-esteem will clearly be negative. If one is told that the price of admission to full participation in the larger society is to no longer be what one has grown up to be, the psychological conflict is surely heightened. And if, collectively, one's group is offered admission only on terms specified by the dominant society, then the potential for social conflict is also increased. Thus assimilationist policies and actions on the part of the larger society can be plausibly linked to greater acculturative stress when compared to integrationist policies.

A related factor, paradoxically, is the existence of policies that are designed to *exclude* acculturating groups from full participation in the larger society through acts of discrimination. To the extent that acculturating people wish to participate in the desirable features of the larger society (such as adequate housing, medical care, and political rights), the denial of these may be cause for increased levels of acculturative stress.

A final set of social variables refers to the acceptance or prestige of one's group in the acculturation setting. As we have seen, some groups are more acceptable on grounds of ethnicity, race, or religion than others; those less acceptable run into barriers (prejudice, discrimination, and exclusion) that may lead to marginalization of the group and that are likely to induce greater stress.

Beyond these social factors, numerous psychological variables may play a role in the mental health status of persons experiencing acculturation. Here again a distinction is useful between those characteristics which were present prior to contact and those which developed during acculturation. In the precontact set of variables are included certain experiences that may predispose an individual to function more effectively under acculturative pressures. These are: prior knowledge of the new language and culture, prior intercultural encounters of any kind, motives for the contact (voluntary vs. involuntary), and attitudes towards contact (positive vs. negative).

Contact experiences may also account for variations in acculturative stress. Whether a person has a lot of contacts with the larger society (or few of them), whether they are pleasant (or unpleasant), whether they meet the current needs of the individual (or not), and in particular whether the first encounters are viewed positively (or not) may set the stage for all subsequent ones and affect mental health.

Among factors that appear during acculturation are the various acculturation strategies. As noted in the previous section, individuals within a group do vary in their preference for assimilation, integration, or separation. These variations, along with experiences of marginalization, are known to affect one's mental health status [Berry et al. 1987].

The personal and societal outcomes of acculturative stress have been known for decades. At the personal level, reduced health (physical, social, and psychological), lowered levels of motivation, a sense of alienation, and increased social deviance have been documented. At the societal level, there are direct counterparts in increased health costs, lower educational and work attainment (with related higher welfare costs), increased social conflict (intrafamilial and intergroup), substance abuse, criminal activity, and a general societal malaise. Clearly, with these outcomes likely, policies that seek to avoid, or at least control, high levels of acculturative stress are to be preferred.

Recent work [Canadian Task Force 1988] indicates that a desire to participate in the larger society, or a desire for cultural maintenance, if thwarted, can lead to a serious decline in the mental health status of acculturating individuals. Policies or attitudes in the larger society that are discriminatory (not permitting participation and leading to marginalization or segregation) or assimilationist (leading to enforced cultural loss) are all predictors of psychological problems. In my view, acculturative stress is always a possible concomitant of acculturation, but its probability of occurrence can be much

reduced if both participation in the larger society and maintenance of one's heritage culture are welcomed by policy and practice of the larger society.

Social Benefits and Costs of Multiculturalism

In this section we draw upon the policy, context, theory, and empirical findings outlined in the previous sections in order to estimate the social benefits and costs of operating a multicultural society. This analysis takes into account both the intended goals of multiculturalism and the actual and possible outcomes that can be discerned in the materials reviewed.

The multiculturalism policy is clearly intended to manage intergroup and interpersonal relations in Canada by creating certain positive conditions for their improvement. The goal of this management is to support (even encourage) groups and individuals to adopt the integration strategy (as defined in this paper), following a midcourse between the alternatives of assimilation and separation, and moving away from the social and psychological pathologies associated with marginalization. While seeking to manage and encourage in these ways, the policy also supports individual and group choice. The emphasis on human rights, social participation, and equity, as well as on group maintenance and intergroup tolerance, demonstrates this concern with individual freedoms. In one sense, it is a balancing act between collective rights and individual rights: collective "lifestyle" preferences should not constrain individual "life chances." In another sense, it is between two sets of collective rights – those of the dominant society and those of the various constituent groups. Value judgments regarding such pluralism and individualism [e.g., Bibby 1990; Spicer 1991; Plaut 1991] are now frequently in the public discourse about multiculturalism. Given the generally personal basis of such judgments, it is difficult to know how representative they are. It is possible, however, to consider these issues drawing upon the evidence reviewed.

With respect to the policy itself, there are two immediate benefits that likely result from its very existence without regard to whether it is "right" or "wrong." First, it demonstrates our social concern for, and attention to, the quality of human relations in Canada. The absence of a policy would presumably signal the opposite. It at least makes all people aware that their ethnocultural and individual needs are not being ignored; psychologically, this may very well be a contributor to morale and self-esteem (which is one of the factors noted earlier that contribute to positive group relations). This benefit may be equally important for members of the larger society, since the multiculturalism policy exists for *all* Canadians.

Second, the policy can be construed as a "primary prevention" programme [cf. Williams and Berry 1991], in which known factors are used to foster

positive relations and adaptations, rather than waiting until problems appear. The intention is to give *every* individual and ethnocultural group (whether dominant or nondominant) a place, a sense of belonging, in Canadian society. Psychologically, such a sense of place may again provide a boost to morale and self-esteem.

Beyond these two possible beneficial consequences of just having a multicultural policy, there are other general benefits that can be linked to its specific content. First is the general point of view that *diversity is a resource*. In biological systems, the greater the variance in a population, the greater is the capacity of that population to deal effectively with changing circumstances. A population that adapts completely to its habitat, by developing a homogeneous response to it, loses its range of alternatives. This view is captured by the adage: "adaptation is the enemy of adaptability." In social systems, homogeneity also reduces the ability of societies and institutions to respond to change, while diversity provides a range of choices.

Four specific instances of this general principle can be identified. In one, Canada's role as an international participant in diplomatic and political events can be enhanced by having a population in which cultural, linguistic, religious, and value sensibilities can be found that match (and hence presumably understand) events in other societies. Our self-image as the international "good boy" is one that most Canadians appreciate, especially when travelling or working abroad, and has come to be a valued element in our definition of what it means to be Canadian. The maintenance of ethnocultural diversity at home may be seen as an important factor in our ability to participate abroad.

The second specific instance is more economic in character (but since it is closely linked to the first, it is mentioned here for completeness). In the initiative called "Multiculturalism Works," the government has emphasized the international trade and domestic employment advantages of maintaining cultural and linguistic diversity in the Canadian population. Knowledge of variations in negotiating style and in subtle interpersonal relations (as well as a knowledge of the language) can be crucial to international economic relations. Such an extant resource in the Canadian population is a clear advantage especially for a country that lags in other competitive domains, such as productivity or research and development activity.

A third specific instance can be identified, this one at the individual level. If the integration mode of acculturation resembles most closely the intention of the multiculturalism policy, then personal diversity (in the sense of knowing how to live and work in two cultural worlds) gives a person flexibility and choice in daily life that those who have become assimilated or remain separated do not have; and, of course, those who have become marginalized have the fewest choices of all.

The fourth specific instance is also at the individual level. Just as there seems to be no limit to the number of languages a person can master, there may well be no limit to the number of cultures an individual can acquire and appreciate. Since one of the goals of our formal educational system is to provide individuals with an enriched environment, it makes sense to provide this in a living environment, rather than just through books or other mediated experience.

The second general benefit of multiculturalism is that, in principle, it permits us to better meet our international *obligations with respect to human rights*. This benefit is rather intangible, but nevertheless important. The extent to which we have actually lived up to our potential is a matter of debate, one that is beyond the terms of reference of this paper. Most would agree, however, that there is room for improvement in many areas (aboriginal rights, national self-determination, culturally sensitive health and education, and the reduction of bias in the policing and delivery of justice). The point is that, with the existence of multiculturalism policy and programmes, there is an ethical framework within which to work towards the improvement of human rights and social conditions in Canada. The alternatives imply the denial of the right to be different (assimilation), the rejection of persons who pursue that right (segregation), or both (marginalization).

The third general benefit of multiculturalism is the potential for promoting the *social and psychological well-being* of all Canadians. Using the framework presented in Figure 3, the potential benefits of the integration option have to be judged in relation to the potential costs of the alternatives. The argument is that integration promotes the social and psychological well-being of all Canadians, while segregation, separation, assimilation, and marginalization reduce them, even for the dominant society.

To begin, I assume that there is no support for a segregation policy: inevitable problems with international diplomacy, trade, and human rights (the benefits just mentioned) would not likely be accepted by Canadians, quite apart from the psychological and social problems that such a policy would entail [Lambley 1980; World Health Organization 1983]. Similarly, while separation is possible (since national self-determination is generally considered to be a basic collective human right), the social conflict and psychological stress associated with this option render it less than attractive for most individuals and groups in Canada. Indeed, all ethnocultural associations and all aboriginal groups who seek an enhanced place for themselves do so with an explicit commitment to achieving it within Confederation. I conclude that, whatever changes may take place in the direction of greater ethnocultural distinctiveness, they are unlikely to entail either segregation or separation as their eventual outcomes.

The second alternative, that of assimilation, has sometimes been promoted on the grounds that the elimination of group differences will lead to the elimination of the basis for social conflict. Two direct arguments are available to counter this position. One is that in contemporary societies which have pursued assimilationist policies (e.g., the United States, *E Pluribus Unum*; and France, *Unité de l'hexagon*), group differences have obviously not been reduced or even disappeared. Black, Hispanic, and Asian cultures have persisted in the United States, as have regional cultures in France (e.g., Breton, Basque, and Catalan). Indeed, both countries have had to make recent changes in their assimilationist stances: bilingual education in the United States and bilingual signs (French-Breton) in France. It is also plausible to relate high levels of overt intergroup conflict (e.g., black-white, Basque-French) and possibly similar levels of social deviance to the struggle over the right to be culturally different in assimilationist societies.

Another direct argument is psychological: individuals, even in homogeneous groups, seek to differentiate themselves from one another, even to the extent of establishing two or more distinct groups within the original population. The work of Tajfel [1978, 1982] has clearly demonstrated this phenomenon. Self-distinctiveness, leading to group distinctiveness, seems to be a fundamental psychological process; where there is a tendency to converge, there is also a tendency to diverge. The implication of this phenomenon of differentiation is that assimilationist activity is likely to be countered by differentiation activity, leading to a nullification of such a policy initiative. Assimilation is thus not only difficult to achieve, but it appears to run counter to a fundamental psychological process.

The third alternative, that of marginalization, has already been described as an outcome fraught with social and psychological pathologies. For example, among aboriginal peoples in the Arctic [e.g., Berry 1990*b*], six indicators of social and mental malaise (suicide, homicide, spousal and child abuse, and alcohol and drug abuse) along with other social indicators (e.g., incarceration) reveal an epidemic of major proportions. Most observers attribute this situation not to qualities of aboriginal peoples, or to the larger society, but to the character of the relationships between them. This is easily identified as a classic case of marginalization of aboriginal peoples by the larger society. The danger of such an outcome befalling other groups is always present and clearly must be avoided at all costs.

The integration option, the one that most closely resembles the main features of the multiculturalism policy in Canada, is thus to be preferred on the basis of the costs associated with the alternatives. However, a strong positive case can be made for integration on its own merits. We have already noted that confidence and a sense of place are likely to be the outcomes of the policy for both dominant and nondominant groups. In both the intergroup relations

and the acculturation literatures, increased potential for security and tolerance and reduced potential for stress were shown to flow from the integrationist strategy. These demonstrable empirical relationships provide the most direct evidence for the social and psychological benefits of multiculturalism to be found in the literature; they are apparently robust and reliable, and they will likely stand the test of future investigation.

Turning to the possible costs of multiculturalism, three distinct arguments have been advanced. First is an *economic* cost; that is, the dollars needed to operate a host of programmes related to the support of cultural and linguistic maintenance, of contact and participation, and of various forms of equity. Most recently, this argument has been heard with respect to bilingualism in Ontario (the French Languages Services Act), but also with respect to immigration, refugees, and pay and employment equity. On the basis of research on one of these issues with one involved group [Berry and Bourcier 1989], my conclusion is that the economic argument is merely an attempt to put a rational front on deep-seated underlying bigotry. In terms used earlier, the economic argument is a "subtle" or "symbolic" form of prejudice and deserves to be recognized as such.

A second possible cost lies in the potential for *ethnic and racial discrimination and inequality*: encouraging people to remain different makes them easy targets for such action. As noted earlier, the existence of the "vertical mosaic" was initially claimed to be evidence of discrimination resulting in inequality among ethnic and racial groups. However, Pineo and Porter [1985] subsequently considered there to be evidence for the "collapse of the vertical mosaic." In a study of educational achievement in Toronto, Richmond [1988] found that while ethnicity was a relatively important factor in determining how far one went in school, second-generation non-British achieved more educational upward mobility than did the second-generation British.

Most recently, Breton et al. [1990] concluded that there is no general relationship between ethnicity and status. Participation varies by ethnic group and by domains (economic, political, and social); sometimes ethnicity is a hindrance, but sometimes it is an asset to full participation in the larger society. Of course, the presence of variability in this phenomenon means that some individuals in some groups in some situations will be the targets of prejudice and discrimination. Most would agree that this is unacceptable in a society which pursues tolerance as a general goal. The culprit, however, is more likely to be specific attitudes towards specific groups in specific circumstances, rather than the general policy of multiculturalism. What is needed is a concerted attack on these instances, rather than attacking the policy as a whole.

Indeed, the current first priority of Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada is race relations, in apparent recognition of where specific problems lie. The evidence presented earlier clearly shows that it is people of non-European

background in Canada who are most negatively evaluated, who are least prestigious, and who are most discriminated against. Alternative explanations are possible (rooted in some possible correlates of "race," such as perceived similarity, familiarity, accent, and values), and these need to be examined systematically before the source of the rejection can be unambiguously identified and the specific root causes dealt with. However, such needed research should not delay the implementation of programmes to reduce the overt discrimination apparent in Canada at the present time.

A third cost is the potential for increased *divisiveness and a reduction of national unity*. In an earlier analysis [Kalin and Berry 1982*b*], the authors concluded that there is no necessary conflict between multiculturalism and achieving national unity. The evidence reviewed suggests that, generally, Canadians are moderately tolerant of diversity and accepting of multiculturalism; there appears to be no serious personal conflict for those who think of themselves as both Canadians and members of a particular ethnocultural group; and there appears to be no serious ethnic or regional conflict that is about to take the form of overt and sustained violence which periodically afflicts other plural societies [Reitz 1988]. If anything, these threats to national unity may be diminished, rather than enhanced, by the multiculturalism policy, giving each individual and group at least some place in an overall national, heterogeneous society.

Other possible costs have been alluded to in the earlier discussions. In the section on immigration, the increasing settlement of visible minorities in the metropolitan centres of Montreal, Toronto, Calgary, and Vancouver was noted. And while it was mentioned that there is no current evidence of a "tipping point" in Canada, it was also noted that the few studies available are outdated and deal mainly with ethnic rather than racial groups. In contrast, popular wisdom frequently assumes that urban concentrations of visible minorities are problematic.

Since there is no clear empirical evidence to decide the point, theoretical positions must be relied upon. On the one hand, urban concentrations provide "targets," but on the other, they provide "support groups." On the one hand they may enhance "cultural maintenance," but on the other, they may inhibit "contact and participation." On the one hand they may generate feelings of threat and insecurity for members of the larger society, but on the other, they may create a sense of security and self-esteem for members of particular groups. We must conclude that on theoretical grounds, as well as on empirical grounds, there is a stalemate. The one clear statement which is possible is that both empirical and theoretical work is urgently needed in order to decide the issue.

Another possible cost alluded to earlier is how easily the larger society can adapt to the changing social reality in Canada. Both the demography and the

policy responses are changing rapidly, and many apparently feel that the speed is too great and the distance too far (for evidence of such views, see Spicer [1991]). Evidence was presented earlier indicating that those who are relatively older, who are less well educated, and who have had few intercultural contacts during their lives are likely to feel threatened by these changes. Aware of current norms about the overt expression of prejudice, many assert their views in economic ("costly," "job loss") or social ("race riots," "lower-quality education") terms. While invalid, these views are important statements of legitimate underlying concerns by members of Canadian society. If treated as such, and if steps are taken to reduce the perception of threat, the potential costs will not likely materialize. If ignored or ridiculed, however, feelings of threat may well be exacerbated, and potential costs will become converted into substantial ones through organized backlash and reaction.

On balance, the benefits of multiculturalism appear to vastly outweigh the costs at the present time. This is partly due to the essential validity of some of the elements of the policy, and partly to a process of continuing refinement of programmes that have been developed to implement the policy. For example, the change in emphasis in the mid-1970s towards contact and participation, and away from group maintenance (sometimes called the shift from "cultural" to "social" priorities), probably reduced the potential for increased ethnocentrism. And the more recent shift towards improving race relations as a key to managing Canada's diversity signals an awareness of the likely major source of social conflict.

The only possible alternative to multiculturalism (assimilation) has not been successful elsewhere in the world and would likely be massively resisted if tried in Canada (leading to levels of social conflict not previously encountered here). In any case, having announced ourselves to the world for two decades as officially multicultural, we are not likely to get away with changing the rules for those who perhaps came for this very reason. Moreover, it would be difficult to justify the differential treatment of British, French, and aboriginal peoples (who clearly would not accept assimilation of one group to another) and those groups who are less well placed demographically or politically in Canadian society.

In conclusion, it appears that the only viable and realistic course is to pursue the integration option, guided by the multiculturalism policy.

Recommendations for Immigration and Multiculturalism Policy

Based on the theoretical and empirical literature, and on the consideration of benefits and costs, my judgment is that there need be no substantial changes

in the multiculturalism policy at the present time. The psychological conditions that underlie the successful operation of a multicultural society are well articulated in the multiculturalism policy and are generally being implemented by the various programmes. These are: *providing a sense of cultural security for all who wish to maintain a degree of cultural distinctiveness and, at the same time, providing opportunities for all to participate equitably in the economic and political life of this country.* In principle, there should be no *cost* to this joint pursuit (in terms of sacrificing one in order to achieve the other), and there can be substantial benefit to pursuing both simultaneously. If these are accomplished, then the third and ultimate policy goal is achievable: *the attainment of a tolerant population, in which there is cultural space and mutual acceptance by all sectors of the Canadian population.*

However, *adjustments* to, and *monitoring* of, programmes implementing multiculturalism and immigration policies are recommended, as follows.

The current and projected levels of *immigrant flow* appear to be relatively neutral in the sense that it contributes adequately to Canada's population needs, meets our international obligations as a humanitarian country reasonably well, and creates no serious backlash in the larger society. However, each of these factors could change rather quickly since both known (e.g., Canada-U.S. free trade) and unknown (e.g., war and famine) events could change the relative outflow/inflow of immigrants and refugees, and depending on both who and how many come, backlash remains a possibility. It is recommended that two activities be carried out:

1 Public education programmes on the benefits of immigration should be offered to both the larger society and to immigrants and refugees themselves. These should include both the economic and noneconomic benefits, as identified in the Economic Council's [1991] study.

2 National, regional, and metropolitan research should be conducted on an ongoing basis to monitor levels of tolerance generally, and acceptance of immigrants and refugees specifically. While results of such research should not determine how many or who can immigrate, knowledge of such attitudes is an important element in any programme decision.

With respect to *optimal community size*, the evidence reviewed indicates no "tipping point" or threshold beyond which intolerance increases. The social ecology study nationally and the Toronto urban studies provide little evidence for *actual rejection* of those who assemble in relatively large numbers in neighbourhoods. However, it must be noted that both studies are based on data from the 1970s and include mainly groups of European heritage. Results for those of non-European background (Canadian Indians in the national study; West Indian, South Asian, and Chinese immigrants in the Toronto studies),

however, suggest relatively *lesser acceptance* than for groups of European background. With increasing immigration of these latter groups, and continuing urban settlement patterns, there is a distinct possibility that a threshold may have been reached at some point over the past decade or may soon be reached. It is recommended that:

3 National, regional, and metropolitan research should be conducted (in conjunction with recommendation no. 2) to monitor levels of acceptance and rejection of community or neighbourhood settlement patterns of current immigrants. While results of such research should not determine settlement policy, knowledge of these levels of acceptance and rejection is an important element in such decisions.

The *integrative capacity* of immigrants is a double-barrelled concept. It depends partly upon their wish to be involved with the larger society (positive attitudes towards assimilation and/or integration), and partly upon acceptance of them by the larger society (positive multicultural ideology generally, and positive attitudes towards the particular group specifically). As we have seen, both elements are highly variable across groups. While most ethnocultural groups appear to favour integration (and, to a lesser extent, assimilation), separation also has some support; and while tolerance is moderately high in the larger society, it is less high among some ethnic and socioeconomic groups, and attitudes towards some specific groups are quite negative. Given this high variability in both elements, no general answer is possible; and given the age of most of the available data, no current estimate for specific groups should be attempted.

Although the Canadian Task Force on Mental Health Issues Affecting Immigrants and Refugees concluded that, generally, immigrants and refugees adapt rather well in Canada, they did identify certain groups at risk: children and youth, women, seniors, and visible minorities. Moreover, they recommended the establishment of a research programme to monitor the adaptation process.

If we consider "integrative capacity" and "immigrant adaptation" to be related notions, then the conclusion to be drawn from both literatures is that we do not have sufficient information on which to base estimates of how well the process will go in the future. Moreover, there are political, economic, and sociocultural factors (beyond the psychological aspects of attitudes and mental health) that also need to be understood. Therefore, in line with the Task Force, it is recommended that:

4 Research should be conducted on the related issues of immigrant integrative capacity and adaptation, taking into account the perspectives of both the larger society and the immigrants themselves.

As we have seen throughout this paper, there is a potential for *backlash* in virtually every domain of Canadian social policy: immigration, refugee acceptance, official bilingualism, multiculturalism, and pay and employment equity. While *ethnic* tolerance appears to be moderately high in Canada, there is some evidence that *racial* tolerance is lower. Moreover, some programmes may be perceived to pose a threat (e.g., "immigrants take jobs") or actually do pose a threat (e.g., in a limited resource domain, such as wages, pay and employment equity can actually reduce one's economic opportunities).

Threat to one's cultural or economic place in Canadian society has been identified as one root of intolerance and serves as a potential basis for backlash. Recent studies of the role of perceived threat and insecurity in such areas as attitudes towards immigrants and refugees and attitudes towards official bilingualism show clearly that individuals who judge themselves to be threatened by such policies will exhibit rejection of them. Backlash, of course, is more than a set of negative attitudes; it requires social organization and public activity. Although such organized backlash is now most apparent with respect to official bilingualism, the danger is if this one "succeeds," it may well serve as a model for other groups to organize and express their particular bigotry. On the horizon are anti-Asian, anti-black, and anti-equity forces. They should not be taken lightly or treated as mere extremists. In times of economic downturn, they can and do attract relatively large numbers of ordinary Canadians who feel threatened and bewildered by these rapid changes to the Canada that they once knew.

To ensure that *all* Canadians feel that they have a place in a multicultural society and, thereby, reduce the potential for backlash, it is recommended that:

5 Public education programmes should be carried out to emphasize that the goals of the multiculturalism policy are equally relevant to *all* Canadians – English, French, Scots, Irish, aboriginals, as well as those less numerous and more recently represented in the Canadian population. No person is immune to feelings of cultural threat at some time or in some neighbourhood; all, therefore, need the reassurance for their place that is conveyed by the policy.

6 Public education programmes on the need for recent and continuing changes in Canadian society and in social policy areas (such as immigration, refugees, and multiculturalism) should be carried out (in conjunction with recommendation no. 1). What is obvious to some may be misunderstood by many others; the potential dangers of backlash are so great that preventive programmes are likely to be very cost effective.

7 Research on the views and motives of organized groups with the potential for backlash should be undertaken. Such research would need to be carried

out openly and with the groups' collaboration, in order to avoid the perception of infiltration or interference.

In addition to the public education and research activities recommended in this paper, there are *mechanisms* already in place to deal with most of these issues. First are the three new programme directions of Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada outlined earlier. It should be clear that there is now a concerted attack on intolerance (particularly on racism), major governmental support for the preservation, enhancing, and sharing of heritage cultures, and a strong commitment to support the full and equitable participation of all racial and ethnocultural groups in Canadian society. Since these three initiatives are relatively new (at least in their present form), it is not yet clear whether they are having their intended (or perhaps having unintended) effects. It is thus recommended that:

8 Programme evaluations be conducted, after three years of operation, of the new initiatives of Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada.

Another mechanism is the Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Programme operated by Employment and Immigration Canada. This programme largely involves nongovernmental organizations and, despite chronic underfunding, these volunteer groups seem to be successful in helping in the adaptation of newcomers to the larger society. In agreement with the views of the Canadian Task Force on Mental Health Issues Affecting Immigrants and Refugees, it is recommended that:

9 Voluntary organizations involved in settlement work, in both the larger society and the ethnocultural communities, should receive sustained funding; and through public education, they should also receive positive recognition for the role they play in primary prevention of social and psychological problems among immigrants and refugees.

Finally, there is a variety of legal mechanisms, including the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Canadian Human Rights Act, the Multiculturalism Act, and various specific laws (e.g., the "anti-hate" laws), that seek to promote many of the positive, while limiting the negative, aspects of human relations. While it is important to continue to monitor the effectiveness of these measures, there does not seem to be the need for any new legal mechanisms to promote positive human relations in Canada.

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